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This paper examines the relation between the degree of firms’ financial 
constraint and the observed rise in the cost of bank financing during the 
global financial crisis of 2008. It introduces a new measure of financial 
constraint: the lending rate paid by each firm on working capital loans. In 
line with previous research, the findings point to a more severe contraction 
in credit supply for more credit constrained firms. Additionally, the results 
show that the existence of collateral and a large portfolio of lenders mitigate 
the credit supply contraction observed in that period. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the key issues raised by the global financial turmoil of 2008 and its deep 
impact  on  the  supply  of  credit  worldwide  is  the  effect  of  financial  dependence  on 
corporate investment decisions. However, to identify this relation it is necessary first to 
investigate to what extent the transmission of a credit supply shock is correlated with 
the  degree  of  corporate  financial  constraint.  Nevertheless,  there  are  still  conflicting 
conclusions  in  the literature about  how a credit crunch is  spread through  economic 
agents, specifically among corporations.  
Even in economies with strong macroeconomic indicators and where the financial 
system proved to be reasonably healthy, the tightening in credit was extremely costly, 
generating large job losses and steep reductions in output. In this context, the global 
financial crisis of 2008 seems to represent a strictly exogenous shock to the Brazilian 
economy,  providing  a  unique  opportunity  to  study  the  transmission  of  exogenous 
shocks through the economy.  
This  paper  analyzes  the  behavior  of  the  Brazilian  credit  market  in  the  months 
immediately  following  the  announcement  of  the  Lehman  Brothers  (LB)  failure  in 
September 2008
1. Using micro data on bank credit transactions it examines the relation 
between the degree of firms’ financial constraint and the change in the cost of bank 
financing during the crisis. The article presents a new measure of corporate financial 
constraint: the effective cost of bank financing (the lending rate paid  by each firm) 
during “normal times”
2. The theme is relevant as it identifies which kind of firms suffer 
more financial constraints in times of crisis, helping governments to meet the growing 
demand for directed credit in those periods.  
A large finance and macroeconomics literature has studied the reasons why some 
firms  are more credit constrained than others  and how these limitations  affect  their 
investment  decisions  and  business  cycles.  Issues  related  to  agency  problems,  as  in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982) and Hart and Moore (1995), 
and information asymmetry, as in Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1984), are widely treated as major sources of financial frictions. An important 
                                                 
1 The combination of strong economic growth, a robust financial system and low dependence on the 
export sector allows me to assume that the failure of LB was a strictly exogenous adverse shock in the 
Brazilian economy.  
2 Two periods were considered as “normal times”: between January 2006 and May 2008 and from 
January 2006 to December 2007. 
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topic is the balance sheet effect, where the condition of borrowers’ net worth is a source 
of output dynamics (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). This mechanism works through the 
value of collateral, which increases during economic booms, reducing agency costs and 
increasing investment, which amplifies the upturn. 
In an attempt to measure the effects of financial constraint on the performance of 
companies, most articles focus on the search for good indicators to classify firms as 
financially  constrained  or  not.  Due  to  the  unavailability  of  data  on  each  credit 
transaction, previous research has used proxies such as firm size, age, credit ratings, 
dividend payout and the type of control to measure constraints. Even a survey of 1,050 
CFOs has been used (Campello, M.., et al., 2010). However, none of them precisely 
reflects the difference between the cost of internal and external financing for each firm
3. 
These are just indicators that are apparently related to agency problems and information 
asymmetry.  For  example,  is  a  firm  that  does  not  distribute  dividends  accumulating 
resources due to the high cost of external financing or because the present value of these 
funds invested in new projects is higher than the current dividend? Does the credit 
rating  reflect  a  firm’s  degree  of  financial  constraint  or  just  its  business  risk? 
Furthermore, firm size may also not be an accurate measure of financial constraint, 
since to generate a given amount of revenue firms in some industries require a greater 
amount of capital employed than others.  
Using a single database, at the level of each credit transaction, here I propose a more 
accurate measure of financial constraint: the interest rate paid by each customer (firm) 
on a bank loan. This indicator reflects the effective cost of bank financing for each firm 
and therefore better reflects the difference between the cost of internal and external 
financing.  
In line with Campello, M. et al, my findings show that the impact of the financial 
crisis was more severe on constrained firms, for which the percentage increase in the 
cost of bank financing was even higher during the peak of the global financial crisis of 
2008. The findings are robust to different measures of financial constraint, such as the 
minimum and the average cost of bank financing and the total volume of loans obtained 
by each firm during “normal times”. 
                                                 
3 This is usually used to define a financial restriction. In this case, any firm that faces a higher cost of 
external financing to internal financing should be classified as financially constrained, and this difference 
is a measure of the degree of constraint faced by it. 
5 
A firm’s degree of financial constraint changes its optimal capital structure, asset 
allocation and payout decisions. Some studies show that constrained firms are more able 
to use their cash flows to finance new projects than less constrained ones (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988) and are therefore less dependent on the financial sector. 
Thus,  more  important  than  identifying  the  degree  of  firms’  financial  constraint  is 
examining what happens in the credit market during periods of financial instability. If 
the increase in the cost of bank financing is more severe for firms that are less credit 
constrained,  then  the  quality  of  the  projects  being  funded  in  the  economy  tends  to 
worsen, raising the risk of default in the future.  
This article is organized as follows: the second section presents some descriptive 
statistics on the Brazilian credit market; the third section brings the empirical strategy, 
the fourth shows the results and the fifth concludes.  
 
2.  Pre-Crisis Bank Credit in Brazil  
This section presents the recent evolution of the credit market in Brazil, focusing on 
the period immediately before the eruption of the global financial crisis in September 
2008. The idea is to present some stylized facts that corroborate the hypothesis assumed 
in  this  study  that  the  announcement  of  the  Lehman  Brothers’  failure  was  a  strictly 
exogenous shock in the Brazilian economy. 
Figure 1 below shows the evolution of credit to GDP ratio for non-directed loans 
(“free credit”) and those made under required government lending programs between 
January 2004 and December 2009, where the dotted line indicates when LB failed. It 
can be seen that the strong growth in the share of free credit to GDP ratio suffered only 
a  mild  slowdown  in  late  2008  and  that  the  contribution  of  directed  credit,  mainly 
through BNDES (the national development bank), provided reasonable stability around 
10% to 15% of GDP (growth of 50% in just one year). 
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of the total balance of free credit, balance of free credit 
for companies and for working capital, in millions of reais, between January 2007 and 
December 2009. Note that the global financial crisis of 2008 had little impact on the 
volume of bank credit in the Brazilian economy. 
 
Despite the limited impact on the volume of credit, the same cannot be said about 
the cost. Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the average interest rate charged by 

























































































































































Fig. 1: Credit / GDP

































































































































Fig. 2: Total Volume of Loans




Although there was a small increase in the average cost of bank financing in the 
months  preceding  September  2008,  interest  rates  rose  sharply  in  the  six  months 
following the outbreak of the crisis, before returning to pre-crisis levels during 2009. 
Despite the strong economic expansion in the pre-crisis period, the quick rise in the 
cost of bank credit in late 2008, partly explained by the expected increase in default 
rates, also reflected the increase in risk aversion in the financial market at that time. 
This deep and sudden change in the cost of credit raises the question of how it was 
distributed among firms and which factors mostly attenuated this effect on them. These 
issues are investigated in the next section.  
 
3.  Empirical Strategy 
The purpose of this study is not to identify different sources of market imperfections 
and  their  impacts  on  investment  decisions,  but  rather  to  indicate  which  factors 

























































































































Fig. 3: Average Interest Rate on Loans























































































































Fig. 4: Average Interest Rate on Loans
Promissory notes Trade bills Working capital
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high financial instability. In this sense, I focus on examining the behavior of the interest 
rates charged on loans for working capital in the three months after the LB failure, 
between October and December 2008, relative to the previous three months, between 
June and August 2008.  
The choice of working capital is justified by the emergency aspect of this type of 
credit  and  because  it  is  usually  a  short-term  arrangement.  That  is,  unlike  credit  to 
finance investment and acquisitions, loans for working capital reflect companies’ needs 
to  continue  meeting  their  short-term  obligations  to  suppliers,  employees  etc.  during 
downturns and hence are less likely to be postponed or subject to a demand shock. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, at least in the short run, the behavior of the interest 
rate  charged  on  this  type  of  loan  will  be  more  associated  with  supply  shocks  than 
demand ones.  
In  relation  to  the  period  adopted,  the  objective  is  also  to  reduce  identification 
problems that could arise regarding supply and demand effects. Thus, the option for just 
three months before and three months after LB’s failure aims to reduce the impact of 
other factors that could alter the interest rates charged on these loans. Moreover, the 
period selected includes both a reasonable period of optimism regarding the probability 
of default as well as the period of greatest instability in the credit market in Brazil 
(fourth quarter 2008).  
Thus, the entire data set consists of a pooled cross-section of firms that obtained 
bank loans for working capital three months before and three months after LB's failure, 
where the variable of interest is the change in the cost of bank financing. The minimum 
and the average lending rate paid by each firm between January 2006 and May 2008, as 
well  as  the  total  volume  of  borrowings,  were  collected  to  build  some  measures  of 
financial constraint. In addition, the model contains some variables traditionally treated 
in the literature as indicators of credit constraints, such as firm size, and as proxies for 
financial dependence, like the economic sector of the firm (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Finally, the fixed effects of each bank are captured by dummy variables.  






a.  Database 
The  database  is  private,  and  comes  from  the  Brazilian  Central  Bank  Credit 
Information System (SCR). This database provides information of all loan contracts 
above  R$5,000.00  (approximately  U$2,700.00).  The  data  set  is  confidential  and 
protected by banking privacy law, only providing information on financial institutions 
as some customer features, such as geographic location, industry, size and credit rating, 
the  last  two  being  assigned  by  the  lending  institution  itself.  I  tallied  all  free  credit 
transactions to finance companies’ working capital at fixed interest rates between June 
2008 and December 2008, for a total of 575,346 loans, from 95 financial institutions
4 to 
324,069  firms
5.  For  the  empirical  exercise,  I  excluded  from  the  sample  all  loans 
originated in September 2008
6 and all firms that borrowed only before LB’s failure 
(June-August 2008) or after it (October-December 2008). Thus, I selected only firms 
that took credit for working capital in these two periods, totaling 59,130 firms and 83 
banks.  
Since it is impossible to identify the reasons why some firms only took out loans 
before LB’s failure, I just present some statistics on them, such as the number of firms 
and the average cost of bank financing between June and August 2008. Altogether, 
116,917 firms took working capital loans between June and August 2008 and did not do 
so again between October and December. It is worth mentioning that a firm’s decision 
to finance its working capital with bank loans in a given period may be associated with 
its ability to attract other sources of funding, its own business cycle or even the possible 
changes in resource needs according to its investment projections. Thus, some problems 
of selection bias may arise. 
My data set was collected at the transaction level, which allowed me to assemble 
information on credit volume, average and minimum interest rate, total provision for 
                                                 
4 I considered only the financial institutions belonging to the following segments: commercial banks, 
commercial bank cooperatives, foreign commercial banks with branches in the country, Banco do Brasil 
and Caixa Econômica Federal (both government-controlled full service banks), and mutual banks. 
5 I also excluded all transactions from interbank transfers, co-obligations, claims to release, related-party 
transactions and loans written off. 
6  I assumed the beginning of the crisis to be the announcement of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
September 2008. Even though it was more a consequence of the existing unfolding crisis, the failure of 
LB marked the start the contagion on the Brazilian economy. Thus, I excluded September from the 
sample because of the difficulty of classifying the loans in this month as being before or after the crisis. 
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future losses, credit risk classification
7 and firm size
8 of each borrower before and after 
the crisis. In addition, I created other indicators for control purpose, such as the length 
of relationship with the borrower, the maturity of the loan, the number of banks from 
which each firm obtained credit and the proportion of loans from government-controlled 
banks
9, both before and after the crisis.  
The interest rates were obtained from the average of all transactions per firm 
whose annual nominal interest rates were above 12% and below 200%
10, weighted by 
volume. The credit risk classification was obtained by both the average and the worst 
risk rating of each customer. As a proxy for firm size, I used both the total amount of 
credit  obtained  by  each  borrower  between  June  and  December  2008  (continuous 
variable) as the average size reported by financial institutions (dummy variable).  
From the final sample, I obtained the percentage change in the weighted average 
interest rate paid by each company after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. I 
constructed  three  measures  of  financial  constraint,  the  minimum  and  the  weighted 
average interest rate paid by each borrower between January 2006 and May 2008 and 
the total volume of loans taken in that period
11. I believe my credit restriction indicator 
is better than those frequently used in the literature, not only because it is a continuous 
measure, but also because it represents the effective average cost of external (bank) 
financing of each firm.  
Table  1  presents  some  statistics  on  loan  volume,  interest  rate  and  the  total 
number of firms and banks for the entire sample and for some subsamples.  
                                                 
7 The risk rating of the customer, ranging from AA (low risk) to HH (high risk), is reported by the lending 
institution, but must follow certain criteria for this classification established by the National Monetary 
Council. 
8 The size of the customer (1: Micro, 2 Small, 3: Medium or 4: Large) is also reported by the lender. 
9 A bank controlled by the government, either wholly owned or by holding the majority of the voting 
capital. 
10 Several banks had annual nominal interest rates below 12% or above 200%, which are clearly out of 
line with the rest of the market. I discarded those transactions and other missing values from the sample. 
Moreover, the 12% cutoff is justified by the fact that an important bank reported annual interest rates of 
12% for all of its customers. 




Note that all firms that took credit in the pre-crisis period had, on average, a 
smaller volume of credit and paid higher interest rates than those that obtained credit in 
both periods. This observation may indicate that, in general, the credit supply shock was 
more severe for smaller and more financially constrained firms. On the other hand, as 
already  mentioned,  several  factors  may  be  correlated  with  the  absence  of  credit 
transactions  during  the  height  of  the  crisis.  Table  1  also  shows  that  the  rise  in  the 
interest rates for firms with credit transactions in both periods, from 46.92% to 53.26%, 
reflects an increase of 13.51% in the cost of bank financing. Table 2 below shows the 
distribution  of  the  average  interest  rates  among  customers  with  different  credit  risk 
classifications (worst risk rating). 
Table 1
Only Post-Crisis 174,058 80 147,569 53.40
(13,597,470) (21.64)
Both Periods 59,130 83 158,509 167,850 46.92 53.26
(1,039,017) (1,419,110) (21.17) (19.07)
Only Pre-Crisis 176,047 86 96,772 49.21
(805,552) (25.00)

















Table 2 shows that firms with the lowest credit risk rating (AA) experienced the 
highest increases in the cost of bank financing during the crisis (27.11%), reducing the 
difference with risky ones. Table 3 below shows the same statistics aggregating the 
firms by ranges of loan loss provision to total loan ratio. In contrast to Table 2, Table 3 
shows that the rise in the lending rate was even higher for riskier firms, indicating that 
the credit risk rating reported by lenders may not be a good measure of credit risk. 
 
Table 2
AA 6,802 42.20 5,941 53.64 27.11%
(15.56) (17.92)
A 24,677 46.92 24,171 52.89 12.72%
(17.69) (17.64)
B 10,409 47.52 10,881 48.19 1.41%
(32.60) (22.47)
C 14,639 49.26 15,210 58.09 17.93%
(18.41) (18.29)
D-H 2,603 41.70 2,927 48.73 16.86%
(16.64) (16.07)

















<  1% 42,718 46.18 42,361 51.28 11.04%
(22.11) (18.97)
1% - 2% 3,136 42.94 3,694 50.76 18.21%
(17.26) (17.76)
2% - 3% 2,226 44.49 1,852 54.03 21.44%
(16.45) (16.51)
> 3% 10,993 51.47 11,223 61.52 19.53%
(18.39) (18.00)
Note: Standard erros in parentheses.

















Table 4 shows the same statistics aggregating the firms by the total volume of 
loans obtained between June and December 2008. 
 
 
Curiously, the percentage change in the average interest rates was higher for 
larger firms (24.23% for those that borrowed more than R$ 1 million, 21.51% from R$ 
500 thousand to R$ 1 million, 14.69% from R$ 100 thousand to R$ 500 thousand and 
12.08% for those that borrowed less than R$ 100 thousand). A priori, it seems that the 
credit contraction was even stronger for larger firms during the financial crisis of 2008. 
This could be explained by the fact that since the 2008 crisis was even stronger in 
developed countries, the increase in the credit risk was even higher for export firms, 
which are usually larger ones in Brazil. The doubt is whether the firm size is related to 
other factors that may change the credit risk in periods of high financial instability. 
Additionally, Table 8 in the appendix provides some statistics for firms grouped 
by  their  economic  sector.  There  is  no  evidence  that  a  specific  sector  represents  a 
significant part of the statistics presented so far. Nonetheless, I added dummy variables 
for  those  sectors  in  the  econometric  model.  The  next  subsection  presents  the 





< R$ 100 thousand 35,264 52.54 58.89 12.08%
(22.03) (18.91)
R$ 100 thousand - R$ 0.5 million 18,031 41.51 47.61 14.69%
(17.24) (16.04)
R$ 0.5 million - R$ 1 million 2,936 33.47 40.67 21.51%
(11.77) (13.82)
> R$ 1 million 2,899 27.89 34.65 24.23%
(12.69) (13.96
Note: Standard erros in parentheses.
Firm Size by total volume:
# of 
firms
   Average 
Interest Rate 
Pre-crisis







b.  Econometric Specification 
The object of interest is not to identify standard features that would be correlated 
with credit constraint, but rather to examine if there is a correlation between the degrees 
of firms’ financial constraint and the observed rise in the lending rates during periods of 
high financial instability.  Here, the measure of credit constraint is  the cost  of bank 
financing in “normal times”, given by the minimum and the average interest rates on 
working-capital  loans  between  January  2006  and  May  2008.  Thus,  the  model  is 
estimated using a pooled cross-section
12, where the dependent variable is the percentage 
change in  the  average interest  rate  charged for working capital  loans  for each firm 
between the three months after and before the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008. 
The baseline specification is: 
 
 
where y2,j is the average interest rate paid by firm j between October and December 
2008, y1,j is the average interest rate paid by firm j between June and August 2008, 
Constraintj is the measure of credit constraint of firm j, Sizej is the log of the total 
volume of loans between June and December 2008 of firm j, Riskj is the ratio of total 
loan loss provision to total loans between October and December 2008 of firm j, ∆Riskj 
is  the  change  in  the  ratio  of  total  loan  loss  provision  to  total  loans  after  the  crisis 
(between October and December 2008 and June and August 2008) of firm j, NumBanksj  
is the number of banks from which firm j obtained loans before the crisis (between June 
and August 2008), Maturityj is the log of the number of days until the maturity of the 
loan, Relationshipj is the log of the length of relationship during the crisis, in days, and 
Prop_Govj indicates the proportion of loans obtained from government-owned banks by 
firm  j.  Dj
b  and  Dj
s  are  dummy  variables  indicating  the  bank  from  which  the  firm 
obtained the loan and the firm’s economic sector, respectively. 
                                                 





For  robustness  purposes,  I  used  three  measures  of  constraint:  (1)  the  minimum 
interest rate paid on loans before the outbreak of the crisis, between January 2006 and 
May 2008, (2) the average interest rate paid on loans before the outbreak of the crisis, 
between January 2006 and May 2008, and (3) the log of the total volume of loans 
granted in that period. I also used the period between January 2006 and December 2007. 
I believe these are reasonable measures because the interest  rate is a nearly perfect 
indicator of credit constraint in the sense that it portrays the cost of bank financing for 
each firm.  
The subject of interest here is to quantify the change in the cost of bank financing 
for firms with different degrees of credit constraint, measured by the coefficient β. The 
next section shows the findings. 
 
4.  Results 
The main hypothesis is tested in the first row, representing the coefficient β. The 
goal is to check whether there is a correlation between the degree of financial constraint 
(here, firms that pay the highest cost for working capital loans during “normal times”) 
and the correction in lending rates during periods of high financial instability. 
Table  5  shows  the  estimates  for  the  three  measures  of  financial  constraint,  as 
mentioned in  the previous section, where  “normal times” corresponds to  the period 
between January 2006 and May 2008. 
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The first column uses the minimum lending rate paid by each firm between January 
2006 and May 2008 as a measure of firm financial constraint. The coefficient associated 
with the credit constraint, β, is 0.011276, which is significant at 1%. This means that for 
a 1% increase in the minimum interest rate paid in “normal times”, the cost of bank 
financing was around 1.12% higher. This result points to the fact that more constrained 
firms were the most affected during the global financial crisis of 2008 in terms of cost 
of bank financing. The second column brings the average lending rate paid by each firm 
between January 2006 and May 2008 as a measure of firm financial constraint. The β 
coefficient is 0.0076 and significant at 1%. So, for a 1% increase in the average interest 
rate paid in during “normal times”, the cost of bank financing was around 0.76% higher.  
The third measure of constraint, the total volume of loans obtained by each firm 
during “normal times”, presented in the third column, assumes that the total volume of 
loans reflects how frequent each firm accesses the banking credit market and so should 
have  a  negative  correlation  with  the  degree  of  firms’  financial  constraint.  The  β 
coefficient  is  -0.05244  and  significant  at  1%.  Thus,  for  a  1%  increase  in  the  total 
Table 5
Dependent Variable:
Measures of Constraint Minimum Average Volume
Independent Variables:
Constraint 0.01 1 1 276*** 0.0076004*** -0.0524403***
[0.0034363] [0.0031 51 2] [0.00979]
Firm Size 0.1 880961 *** 0.1 73665***
[0.0209987] [0.0200392]
∆ Firm Credit Risk 1 .1 63488*** 1 .1 65838*** 1 .22301 5***
[0.1727278] [0.1 723946] [0.1 68961 4]
Firm Credit Risk -0.1 277867 -0.1 301 026 -0.23641 64




Relationship 0.201287*** 0.1 923064*** 0.21 78974***
[0.013371] [0.01 21 707] [0.01 281 69]
# of banks Pre-Crisis -0.9967536*** -0.9974929*** -0.8487827***
[0.0437573] [0.0453305] [0.0372378]
∆ Proportion of public-owned lender -3.595066*** -3.590772*** -3.566637***
[0.1004437] [0.1 00505] [0.1 00621 7]
R
2 0.3385 0.3376 0.3351
# of obs 45,332 45,332 45,332
*,** and *** indicate significant coefficients at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Robust standard erros in brackets. Firm economic sector and bank dummies included.
∆% Average Interest Rate
jan 2006 - may 2008
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volume of loans obtained during “normal times”, the cost of bank financing was around 
5.244% lower.  
Hence, the findings indicate that the observed rise in the cost of bank financing 
during the peak of the global financial crisis of 2008 was even greater for constrained 
firms, that is, those that already paid higher lending rates and borrowed less during 
“normal times”. 
Furthermore,  Table  5  shows  a  positive  correlation  between  firm  size  and  the 
percentage change in the cost of credit during the crisis. The coefficient is significant at 
1% and approximately 0.18, indicating that for a 1% increase in total credit obtained 
between June and December 2008, the average interest rate was 18% higher. This effect 
indicates that, on average, large firms suffered even more credit restrictions during the 
global  financial  crisis  of  2008,  confirming  the  suspicion  indicated  by  the  statistics 
presented in Table 4.  
As expected, Table 5 shows a positive correlation between the change in the cost of 
credit  and  the  change  in  the  firms’  credit  risk,  measure  by  the  ratio  of  loan  loss 
provisions to total loans. The coefficient indicates that for a 1% increase in the firms’ 
credit risk, the cost of bank financing was around 1.16% higher. In addition, there is no 
correlation between the level of credit risk and the change in the lending rate during the 
crisis. 
As also expected, there is a negative correlation between the lending rate and the 
loan maturity. Quantitatively, for a 1% increase in loan maturity the lending rate was 
0.81% lower. 
A  long  relationship  between  borrower  and  lender  can  reduce  the  problems  of 
information  asymmetry,  bringing  benefits  to  borrowers.  On  the  other  side,  a  longer 
relationship increases the information advantage of the lender, enhancing its monopoly 
power over the borrower. In that case, it could be detrimental to the borrower. The 
empirical  literature  provides  support  for  both  predictions.  Table  5  shows  there  is  a 
positive correlation between the time of relationship and the change in the lending rate 
during  the  crisis,  on  the  order  of  20%  higher  for  a  1%  increase  in  the  time  of 
relationship, indicating that the monopoly power reaction dominates the reduction in 
information asymmetry.  
Additionally, for each additional bank from which firms obtained loans before the 
crisis,  the  change  in  the  cost  of  bank  financing  was  approximately  100%  lower, 
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indicating the importance for firms to have multiple lenders and then be able to choose 
the best financing option in times of crisis. Moreover, the lending rate was 4.6% lower 
for a 1% increase in the proportion of loans from government-owned banks, reflecting 
the government intervention during the crisis. 
For robustness purposes, Table 7 in the appendix brings the same estimates using 
the period between January 2006 and December 2007 as “normal times”. The results are 
basically the same.   
The findings can also be explained by the correlation between the lending rate and 
the existence (and its expected liquidation value) of guarantees in each loan agreement. 
The idea is that some firms pay lower interest rates because their borrowing is intensive 
in  collateral,  reducing  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  problems.  And  since 
collateral is particularly useful during “bad times”, those contracts become valuable in 
periods  of  high  financial  instability,  raising  the  interest  spread  between  non-
collateralized and collateralized loans. However, some could argue that the expected 
liquidation value of those assets tends to worsen during “bad times”, decreasing the 
interest spread. That is, since the cost of external financing is associated with the value 
of collateral, loans backed by strong collateral – hence less risky – would suffer the 
greatest  interest  rate  increases  in  times  of  crisis  due  to  the  fall  in  the  expected 
liquidation value of these assets. 
If the loan loss provision to total loans ratio is a good proxy for credit risk, it should 
capture all of these collateral effects. However, some studies have shown that banks 
often use their loan loss provision account to meet some specific targets, such as to 
smooth income. In order to disentangle such effect, I introduce in the baseline model a 
variable to indicate how intensive in guarantees each loan agreement is. As there is no 
information about the value of such guarantees in the database, only the existence of in 
rem guarantees could be included.  
Table  6  presents  the  estimates  of  the  new  model,  where  Collateralized  Loansj 
indicates the proportion of in rem guarantee between June and August 2008 for firm j 




The results show that the lending rates during the 2008 crisis were 14.8% lower for 
collateralized loans relative to non-collateralized ones and 18% lower for loans that 
became backed by collateral during the crisis.  
In  general,  the  results  show  a  greater  rise  in  the  cost  of  bank  credit  for  more 
constrained firms, i.e., those that paid a higher lending rate on their bank loans before 
the crisis. This effect is on the order of 1% (0.7%) on the percentage change in the 
interest  rate  paid  during  the  crisis  for  each  positive  percentage  point  change  in  the 
minimum (average) interest rate paid in “normal times”. Another important effect is that 
the rise in the cost of credit during the crisis was even greater for larger firms and for 
those with longer relationships with their lenders, and lower for firms that borrowed 
Table 6
Dependent Variable:
Measures of Constraint Minimum Average
Independent Variables:
Constraint 0.01 1 0271 *** 0.007507**
[0.0034312] [0.0031 448]
Collateralized Loans -0.1 480098*** -0.1 481 799***
[0.0380664] [0.0378867]
∆ Collateralized Loans -0.1 77971 2*** -0.1 807755***
[0.0364004] [0.0364683]
Firm Size 0.1 922341 *** 0.1 777755***
[0.021267] [0.020256]
∆ Firm Credit Risk 1 .1 69589*** 1 .1 72035***
[0.1727975] [0.1 724673]
Firm Credit Risk -0.1 335476 -0.1 35696




Relationship 0.2013056*** 0.1 92394***
[0.0133686] [0.01 21 696]
# of banks Pre-Crisis -0.9977665*** -0.9983738***
[0.0437388] [0.04531 27]




# of obs 45,332 45,332
*,** and *** indicate significant coefficients at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Robust standard erros in brackets. Firm economic sector and bank dummies included.
∆% Average Interest Rate
jan 2006 - may 2008
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from several lenders before the crisis. Additionally, the change in the lending rates was 
even greater for non-collateralized loans, indicating that in rem guarantees are more 
valuable during periods of high financial instability. 
Thus, the results presented in this article draw attention to the asymmetric effects on 
the cost of bank financing in times of crisis between firms with different access to bank 
lending. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Using micro data on bank lending, this  article  analyzed the impact  of  the 2008 
global financial crisis on the cost of bank financing for firms classified as financially 
constrained  versus  those  not  constrained.  The  article  presented  a  single  measure  of 
financial constraint: the effective cost of bank financing (the minimum and the average 
interest rate paid on each loan). 
In line with previous research, the results indicate that the financial crisis of 2008 
was more detrimental in terms of cost of credit to more financially restricted firms. In 
addition,  some  factors  contribute  to  mitigate  such  supply  contraction,  such  as  the 
existence of in rem guarantees and a large number of lenders in the firm portfolio of 
financing partners.  
To test the impact of the value of collateral on the cost of bank loans, some data on 
firms’  balance  sheets  and  loan  contract  features,  such  as  the  value  and  the  type  of 
guarantee used, would be necessary. Another important explanation for the findings is 
that part of the rise in the cost of credit in fact represented the increase in the cost of 
bank funding, which of course disproportionately affects loans with lower interest rates. 
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Measures of Constraint  Minimum  Average  Volume 
Independent Variables: 
Constraint  0.0106355***  0.0073146**  -0.0540712*** 
[0.0033668]  [0.0032097]  [0.0107433] 
Firm Size  0.1982917***  0.1838933*** 
[0.0217246]  [0.0208813] 
?   Firm Credit Risk  1.149817***   1.150821***   1.2285*** 
[0.1797645]  [0.1795158]  [0.1756619] 
Firm Credit Risk  -0.1354628  -0.1397509  -0.2717648* 
[0.1543862]  [0.1541645]  [0.1506883] 
? 
  
Maturity  -0.0088991***  -0.0089508***  -0.0092852*** 
[0.0008312]  [0.0008317]  [0.0008445] 
Relationship  0.2150101***   0.2073546***  0.232783*** 
[0.0145615]  [0.0135269]  [0.0143359] 
# of banks Pre-Crisis  -1.006413***  -1.0065***  -0.8513174*** 
[0.04681]  [0.0484166]  [0.0393383] 
?   Proportion of public-owned lender  -3.541637***  -3.538295***  -3.516275*** 
 [0.1058]  [0.1059073]  [0.1058856] 
R  2  0.3237  0.3228  0.3200 
# of obs  40,656  40,656  40,656 
*,** and *** indicate significant coefficients at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. Firm economic sector and bank dummies included. 
Jan 2006 - Ded 2007 
?  % Average Interest Rate 
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   Average 
Interest Rate  
Pre-crisis 
   Average 





1 - Public Administration and ONGs  219  48.36  55.92  15.63% 
      (19.10)  (18.20)    
2 - Agriculture  777  47.07  54.27  15.29% 
      (22.28)  (20.44)    
3 - Foods  1,804  45.39  52.39  15.42% 
      (20.41)  (19.42)    
4 - Financial Services  361  48.37  56  15.77% 
      (18.64)  (18.18)    
5 - Automotive  4,5223  45.93  53.23  15.89% 
      (20.87)  (18.64)    
6 - Beverages and Tobacco  528  48.93  54.41  11.19% 
      (22.40)  (18.86)    
7 - Construction, Wood and Furniture  9,910  47.44  53.42  12.60% 
      (21.82)  (19.38)    
8 - Farming  1,196  46.7  53.69  14.96% 
      (21.52)  (19.69)    
9 - Electronics  2,499  47.04  52.82  12.28% 
      (20.97)  (17.94)    
10 - Energy  106  36.2  41.42  14.41% 
      (17.33)  (14.15)    
11 - Machinery and Equipment  1,408  45.28  51.02  12.67% 
      (21.17)  (19.12)    
12 - Media and Entertainment  4,786  47.92  54.52  13.77% 
      (19.84)  (18.70)    
13 – Pulp and Paper  271  44.01  47.37  7.63% 
      (21.62)  (16.41)    
14 – Petrochemicals  2,284  42.82  49.07  14.59% 
      (23.26)  (20.71)    
15 - Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Hygiene  2,194  44.3  51.52  16.29% 
      (19.58)  (18.74)    
16 - Health, Sanitation and Education  2,869  47.28  52.18  10.36% 
      (21.87)  (18.51)    
17 - Services  5,535  49.18  55.68  13.21% 
      (19.81)  (18.53)    
18 - Iron and Steel  1,110  43.77  48.65  11.14% 
      (21.40)  (18.26)    
19 - Sugarcane  65  34.66  40.7  17.42% 
      (22.90)  (19.82)    
20 - Telecomunication  69  48.17  51.24  6.37% 
      (24.59)  (19.07)    
21 - Textile and Leather  6,960  46.07  52.21  13.32% 
      (21.12)  (18.49)    
22 - Transportation  2,593  48.66  54.98  12.98% 
      (21.46)  (20.23)    
23 - Retail  6,094  48.24  55.21  14.44% 
      (21.38)  (19.04)    
24 - Other  965  45.06  51.14  13.49% 
      (21.21)  (19.51)    
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